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I. INTRODUCTION
As we approach the half-century celebration of the administrative
law process, a general review of its adversarial practices is warranted.1
Judicial formalization of the administrative process has risen signifi-
cantly.2 The phenomenon should invite continuous analytical review of
its propriety because of the increasing impact and influence that the
administrative process has on institutional America.3
The technical application of evidence and constitutional rule theo-
ries to the administrative process encourages judicial formalization"
* Professor of Law, Thomas M. Cooley Law School, B.A. 1964, Eastern Michigan
University; M.A. 1966, Wayne State University; J.D. 1969, University of Detroit.
1. See Breger, Administrative Law After Forty Years, 33 FED. B. NEWS & J. 297
(1986) (reviewing administrative law since the Administrative Procedure Act).
2. See generally Davis, Judicialization of Administrative Law: The Trial-Type
Hearing and the Changing Status of the Hearing Officer, 1977 DuKE L.J. 389, 393-400;
Schwartz, Administrative Law: The Third Century, 29 ADMIN. L. REV. 291, 299-309
(1977) (describing judicialization of administrative procedure).
Passage of the Administrative Procedure Act gave minimal endorsement to judicial
formalities. See Scotland, After 25 Years: We Come to Praise the APA and Not to Bury
It, 24 ADMIN. L. REV. 261, 265 (1972).
3. Formal adjudication of administrative proceedings has risen significantly. See
generally Davis, supra note 2.
4. See Gladstone, The Adjudicative Process in Administrative Law, 31 ADMIN. L.
REV. 237, 241 (1979) (describing the administrative process as "hobbled in bureaucratic
1
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and does not give the process much flexibility.5 The traditional theory
in administrative proceedings rejects technical application of both evi-
dentiary and constitutional theories to the administrative process. For-
malization is, however, a necessary risk that is required to preserve ad-
ministrative credibility and fairness. Formalization is justified
sometimes on the belief that these technical theories apply only to jury
trials.6
The emergence of modern day jury trials precipitated the develop-
ment and application of exclusionary rules of evidence.7 Constitutional
exclusionary rule theories, however, do not rest on the existence of a
jury for their application.8
Common-law commentators viewed the development of eviden-
tiary rules as a method for insulating the unsophisticated jury from
reviewing misleading, but perhaps relevant, evidence.9 Modern evi-
dence codes make no evidentiary distinction between bench or jury
trial application. 10 To suggest that technical rules of evidence are ex-
clusively within the operative province of the untrained trier of fact is
to raise significant doubt about the propriety of modern evidence
codes. This is not a viable thought. Indeed, the judiciary is most active
in technical evidence theory application.1
red tape and drowning in a sea of due process").
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 4(b) (1983); Davis, An Approach to
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 371-72
(1942).
7. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 244 (3d ed. 1984).
8. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46 (1985)
(noting that due process can be satisfied without a full evidentiary hearing); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-70 (1970) (procedural due process requirements of notice and
opportunity to be heard satisfied without judicial or quasi-judicial trial).
The Supreme Court does not distinguish between jury and nonjury trials when it
applies constitutional safeguards. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166-74
(1952) (nonjury trial conviction reversed because evidence was obtained in violation of
defendant's due process right against self-incrimination).
9. See, e.g., J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 266, 509 (1898) (evidence law does not aid in finding the truth, but aids the un-
trained jurors); see also 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 4b (1983) (citing Thayer and noting
that evidence law is best suited to jury trials).
10. Contrary to common-law doctrine, the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) do not
distinguish between jury and nonjury trials in terms of their applicability. For a collec-
tion of common-law doctrines that have been applied to evidentiary challenges in non-
jury trials, see Maguire & Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to
Admissibility, 36 YALE L.J. 1101 (1927); Note, Applicability of Rules of Evidence Where
the Judge is the Trier of Facts in an Action At Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 258 (1928).
11. See generally Allen, The Explanatory Value of Analyzing Codifications By
Reference to Organizing Principles Other Than Those Employed in the Codification, 79
Nw. U.L. REV. 1080, 1085-96 (1985).
[Vol. 42
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Leading common-law commentators were similarly convinced that
requiring the application of technical evidentiary rules to administra-
tive proceedings would conflict with the flexible standards inherent in
the administrative process.12 Review of modern codes of evidence re-
futes such summary analysis.'3
In keeping with common-law sentiment, Congress enacted the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.14 This legislation rejected technical appli-
cation of the rules of evidence to the administrative process.15 Thus,
standards of relevancy became uniquely dispositive over admission
claims.' This does not guarantee that all relevant evidence will be ad-
mitted, but it prevents some evidence from being excluded wrongfully.
While unchallenged adherence to a relevancy admission standard
may result in compromised findings, the courts continue to avoid tech-
nical rules of evidence in the administrative forum.'7 One justification
for avoiding technical rules of evidence is that administrative law
judges, by virtue of their training and experience, are uniquely quali-
fied to ignore problematic evidence. 8 The Attorney General's Commit-
tee on Administrative Procedure suggested that "[t]he absence of a
jury and the technical subject matter with which agencies often deal,
all weigh heavily against a requirement that administrative agencies
observe what is known as the 'common law' rules of evidence . . . 9
Allowing administrative law judges to ignore judicial rules of evi-
12. See, e.g., 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 4b (1983); see
also Wigmore, Administrative Boards and Commissions: Are the Jury Trial Rules of
Evidence in Force for Their Inquiries?, 17 ILL. L. REV. 263 (1922) (discussing the extent
to which rules of evidence bind tribunals).
13. Federal Rule of Evidence 102 provides that "[t]hese rules shall be construed to
secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth
may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EvID. 102. The Federal
Rules of Evidence provide the trial court with sufficient powers of flexibility while pre-
serving credibility safeguards against problematic offerings of evidence. See B.
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.3 (2d ed. 1984).
14. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344 (1988)).
15. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 115 (1976).
16. See Administrative Procedure Act, § 7(c), 60 Stat. 237, 241 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988)); see also Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174
F.2d 676, 690-91 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949) (allowing hearsay evidence
to be used in administrative procedure if relevant).
17. See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971) (upholding the use of
relevant hearsay evidence in a social security disability case by the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare).
18. See generally Davis, supra note 2, at 400-03.
19. ATT'Y GE.'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROc., FINAL REPORT 70 (1941), reprinted in
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 70 (C. Woltz ed. 1968).
1991]
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dence because of their expertise cannot be justified. The nation's judi-
ciary deals with equally sophisticated subject-matter, but is bound by
institutional rules of evidence.20 The subject-matter's sophistication
should not control the evidence's credibility. Indeed, some states re-
quire administrative law judges to comply with judicial rules of evi-
dence to ensure the fairness of the proceedings.
21
The need for judicial rules of evidence is more urgent in adminis-
trative proceedings than in common-law judiciary settings. A lay com-
missioner often initially reviews the evidence in administrative pro-
ceedings.22 It is possible, therefore, to compromise the credibility of
evidence because of the inherent likelihood of disproportionate defer-
ence to a problematic administrative trial record. Strict application of
the theories of evidentiary law would reduce the potential for these
consequences. Administrative law tradition rejects technical compli-
ance, however, even with the most familiar evidentiary and constitu-
tional exclusionary rules.
23
This Article questions the propriety of the administrative freedom
to reject technical compliance with the rules of evidence. To the extent
that administrative law proceedings focus on flexibility and fairness,
the select application of technical evidentiary and constitutional theo-
ries actually promotes respect for the administrative process because
the technical rules articulate standards of relevance, credibility, and
fairness. Indeed, litigators often invoke these technical rules hoping to
direct the administrative law judge toward predetermined patterns of
fairness.
24
20. The Federal Rules of Evidence were designed to limit judicial power over the
admission of evidence. See generally Allen, supra note 11 (arguing that rules of evidence
should clarifv the relationship between judge and jury).
21. See, e.g., Johnson v. Department of Health & Rehabilitation Servs., 546 So. 2d
741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Eastman v. Department of Pub. Aid, 178 Ill. App. 3d 993,
534 N.E.2d 458 (1989); Kade v. Charles H. Hickey School, 80 Md. App. 721, 566 A.2d 148
(Ct. Spec. App. 1989); Sims v. Baer, 732 S.W.2d 916 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Anaya v. State
Personnel Bd., 107 N.M. 622, 762 P.2d 909 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 673, 763
P.2d 689 (1988); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation
Bd. of Review, 129 Pa. Commw. 417, 565 A.2d 1246 (1989).
22. See Gladstone, supra note 4, at 238-40.
23. See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971) (admitting a medical
report despite its hearsay character); Anderson v. FAA, 827 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1026 (1988) (hearsay documents admissible in administrative pro-
ceeding); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Gardner, 417 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir. 1969) (noting that
hearsay evidence is generally admissible in an administrative proceeding), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 938 (1970); Holte v. State Highway Comm'n, 436 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1989) (in-
toxilyzer test results admissible despite having been obtained unconstitutionally).
24. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Laudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1983) (due process stan-
dard violation alleged at administrative hearing); Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.
1969) (hearsay objection in administrative proceeding), rev'd sub nom. Richardson v.
[Vol. 42
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Although courts historically have adhered to administrative re-
strictions on the use of technical evidence and constitutional rules, re-
cent decisions suggest a willingness to use these rules more freely.2"
The willingness to interject evidentiary and constitutional rules into
contested administrative proceedings may be a result of the modern
court's desire to ensure institutional fairness. Recent trends in admin-
istrative law invite such pragmatic interests.2 s The sophisticated
growth of the administrative process suggests that the use of these
technical rules should be the norm instead of the exception.
27
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN HEARSAY RULE THEORIES AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRINCIPLES
The hearsay rule began as the foremost technical symbol of exclu-
sionary theories of evidence.28 The inherent unfairness in the absence
of an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant led to the develop-
ment of the hearsay rule.29 Today cross-examination remains the fun-
damental mechanism to evaluate a witness's credibility. 30 The value of
questioning a declarant suggests that absent cross-examination, prof-
fered hearsay evidence should not be judicially received. This general-
ization seriously compromises the theories of hearsay law.
Codified evidentiary law provides for the admission of some types
of hearsay despite the absence of a cross-examination of the declar-
Revales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Whitlow v. Board of Medical Examiners, 248 Cal. App. 2d
478, 56 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1967) (hearsay objection in administrative proceeding); Swegle v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 125 Cal. App. 2d 432, 270 P.2d 518 (1954) (hearsay objection
in administrative proceeding), overruled, Kirby v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals
Bd., 8 Cal. App. 3d 1009, 87 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1970).
American lawyers embrace the adversarial process and, as a result, common-law dis-
pute traditions dominate their behavioral practices. See Allen, supra note 11, at 1081.
25. See, e.g., Hancock v. State Dep't of Revenue, 758 P.2d 1372 (Colo. 1988);
Wright v. Department of Educ., 523 So. 2d 685 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Feldman v.
Board of Appeal, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 559 N.E.2d 1263 (1990) (en banc).
26. See Dyson v. State Personnel Bd., 213 Cal. App. 3d 711, 262 Cal. Rptr. 112
(1989); In re Arbitration between Minnesota State Troopers Ass'n v. State Dep't of Pub.
Safety, 437 N.W.2d 670 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
27. See Davis, supra note 2, at 400; Schwartz, supra note 2, at 303. This Article
does not focus on the high volume of adjudication in administrative law proceedings.
The high volume of claims often provides the justification for the rejection of technical
evidentiary and constitutional law theories in administrative proceedings. Pragmatic
concerns for the time delays to process administrative claims, however, should not result
in the isolation of legitimate evidentiary challenges. See generally id. at 303-05.
28. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 224 (3d ed. 1984) (history of the rule
against hearsay).
29. See id. § 245.
30. See id.
1991]
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ant.31 The admission of hearsay when the declarant is not available for
cross-examination is limited to narrow exceptions, 2 which were
founded on judicial recognition that some circumstances provide a
measure of reliability.3 3 As a result, the hearsay rule generally enhances
the credibility of evidence.
3 4
Proponents of a flexible administrative process, however, criticize
strict application of evidentiary rules.35 This criticism is based primar-
ily on the misconception that hearsay evidence doctrines uniquely ap-
ply to jury trials.38 As previously noted, however, modern codes of evi-
dence do not distinguish between jury and nonjury trials.
3 7
In Dallo v. INS3 s the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a re-
hearing request that concerned the evidentiary admission of an affida-
vit. The court noted the hearsay nature of the proffered affidavit, but
stated that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to immigration
hearings. The court professed adherence to administrative law tradi-
tion.40 Despite this assertion, the court upheld the admission of evi-
dence that the government made a good faith effort to produce the
declarant for cross-examination. 41 Thus, the Dallo court, despite its
protest to the contrary, selectively applied technical evidentiary rules
theories. Implied or expressed application of cross-examination oppor-
tunities are central to fundamental principles of fairness in contested
administrative matters.42 The court implicitly recognized that the op-
portunity for cross-examination is usually required prior to the admis-
sion of hearsay, even in administrative proceedings. 43
In Baliza v. INS44 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a
31. See FED. R. EviD. 803, 804 (providing certain hearsay exceptions when the de-
clarant is unavailable and when availability of the declarant is immaterial).
32. Id.
33. See generally Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 UCLA L. REV.
43, 43-45 (1954) (discussing the foundation of the hearsay rule and its exceptions).
34. See generally Weinstein, The Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REv. 331,
332-34 (1961) (discussing the nature of the hearsay problem).
35. See, e.g., Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARv. L. REV. 364 (1942).
36. See, e.g., id. at 371-74.
37. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
38. 765 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1985).
39. Id. at 586.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id.; see also Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (federal agency could
not deprive an individual of his security clearance for alleged communist sympathies
without affording the individual the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses testifying
against him).
43. See Dallo v. INS, 765 F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir. 1985).
44. 709 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 42
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deportation order after finding that the government could not proffer
an extrajudicious statement without making a reasonable effort to lo-
cate and produce the declarant for cross-examination.45 The factual
difference between Dallo and Baliza is the degree of the government's
effort to produce the declarant as a witness. Both courts applied tradi-
tional evidentiary theory to the administrative appeals.
Cross-examination opportunities provide the theoretical justifica-
tion for the admission of extrajudicial utterances. Strict adherence to
an admission standard that absolutely requires an opportunity for
cross-examination, however, results in probative evidence being ex-
cluded from the fact-finding process. Thus, the framers of exclusionary
rules of evidence recognize the need for pragmatic exceptions to the
cross-examination requirement.4" Consequently, a number of needed
exceptions have been gradually developed and introduced into the
common law.47 These exceptions, which are based on circumstantial re-
liability of evidence, eliminate the need for strict adherence to the
cross-examination requirement.48 Modern evidentiary codes embrace
this common-law development.4"
Given the importance and extent of institutional record keeping,
the business records and the public records exceptions are perhaps the
most important exceptions to challenged hearsay evidence. The routine
practices surrounding the creation and storage of these records provide
the required indicia of reliability to allow admission. 50 Recognizing
this, judges have utilized the exceptions in administrative proceedings.
In Department of Revenue & Taxation v. Hull5 ' the Wyoming Su-
preme Court upheld the admission of state documentary evidence
against hearsay and due process challenges in an administrative pro-
ceeding.2 By rejecting the hearsay challenge, the court recognized that
the disputed evidence constituted a public records exception under
Wyoming's evidentiary code.53 Thus, the court considered the evidence
to be sufficiently reliable for admission even though the opportunity
for cross-examination was not available.14 The court's holding reflects
45. Id. at 1234.
46. See, e.g., Falknor, supra note 33, at 43-45.
47. See id. at 49-82.
48. See generally Weinstein, supra note 34, at 347-48 (explaining Wigmore's ra-
tionale for hearsay exceptions).
49. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note.
50. See generally C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE §§ 304, 306, 315 (3d ed. 1984) (discuss-
ing the two exceptions); Laughlin, Business Entries and the Like, 46 IowA L. RaV. 276,
285-87 (1961) (discussing the requirement that business records be kept regularly).
51. 751 P.2d 351 (Wyo. 1988).
52. Id. at 357.
53. Id. at 353-55.
54. The Wyoming Code of Evidence provided for admissibility of public records
1991]
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the pragmatic codification of hearsay exceptions. 55
The importance of the Hull case is its application of technical evi-
dentiary rules to the administrative process. If flexible administrative
law principles had been the only means of challenging the evidence in
Hull, the evidence undoubtedly would have been admitted because it
was relevant. If the courts were to allow all relevant evidence to be
admitted, however, the evidence verification theory would be compro-
mised. The Hull court recognized the importance of both relevant and
technical standards to test the credibility of evidence.5
In Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles57 the California
Court of Appeals acknowledged that hearsay evidence alone might be
sufficient to justify a revocation of a driver's license if the evidence is
reliable and trustworthy. The court noted that the challenged offerings
of evidence were official reports and, therefore, were admissible under
the state's traditional evidentiary code.58 Snelgrove appears to be con-
sistent with traditional evidence law.
In Wright v. Department of Education9 a Florida appellate court
upheld the Department of Education's ruling that the appellant was
ineligible for vocational rehabilitation services. The court based its de-
nial upon a finding of behavioral problems. On appeal the appellant
claimed that the court erroneously admitted the reports, which docu-
mented his behaviorial problems because they were hearsay.6" The
court found no merit in this assertion.61 The court noted that although
the disputed reports were hearsay, they were admissible under the bus-
iness records exception. 62 Social workers and doctors used the reports
to render professional judgments on the propriety of assigning voca-
tional rehabilitation services. To the extent the court acknowledged
this extrajudicial usage, technical reliance on hearsay rule theories and
unless the circumstances indicated a lack of trustworthiness. See id. at 354.
55. See FLD. R. EVyD. 803 advisory committee's note (one justification for the codi-
fied hearsay exceptions). In Beauchamp v. DeAbadia, 779 F.2d 773 (lst Cir. 1985), the
court upheld the administrative admission of hearsay documents against due process
challenges for want of cross-examination privileges. The court recognized that relevant
hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings and the right to cross-examine wit-
nesses is not absolute. Id. at 775-76. The First Circuit's reasoning is consistent with the
reasoning of modern evidentiary law. In fact, the petitioner in Beauchamp conceded that
most of the challenged hearsay evidence would have been admissible under the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Id. at 775.
56. Hull, 751 P.2d at 356.
57. 194 Cal. App. 3d 1364, 240 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1987).
58. Id. at 1374-76, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 287-89.
59. 523 So. 2d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 682-83.
62. Id. at 682.
[Vol. 42
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principles is evident.6 3 Thus, this decision is a technical application of
the rules of evidence; it provides a just and fair result and still pre-
serves the traditional means of verifying evidence.
Explicit adherence to the exceptions doctrine as the sole justifica-
tion for document admission may not be persuasive. Because the draft-
ers of the modern evidentiary codes are concerned with protecting
credibility safeguards, business and public records may be judicially
excluded on the grounds of credibility, notwithstanding their historic
exceptions status.
6 4
In Juste v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services6 5 the
Florida District Court of Appeals reversed an administrative body's
finding that disqualified the petitioner from receiving social services
benefits.6 The petitioner alleged error in the admission of suspect
hearsay evidence by the administrative body. The disputed evidence
consisted of summary reports from interviews with the government's
witnesses. The government argued that the reports were public records
and admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Although the proffered reports could have been admitted as an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule, the appellate court rejected the govern-
ment's argument and noted that the challenged evidence contained
multilevels of hearsay without proper justification of credibility.
6 7
Thus, the mere existence of hearsay exceptions does not ensure the
admissibility of evidence. The Juste court affirmed the principle that
suspect hearsay evidence should not be admitted in administrative
hearings.68 This is consistent with codified evidentiary law and with
recent administrative trends. 9
Uniquely problematic to the administrative hearing process is the
systematic proffering of agency files. Administrative tradition often al-
lows the admission of these files without applying technical rules of
evidence.7 0 For example, a Louisiana statute provides that "[a]ll evi-
63. The Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly codify this observed usage. FED. R.
EVID. 703 (allows experts to use inadmissible hearsay to form an opinion if it is of a type
typically relied upon by those experts).
64. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (allowing into evidence business records that are
regularly kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity unless the circum-
stances suggest lack of trustworthiness).
65. 520 So. 2d 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
66. Id. at 73.
67. Id. at 70-73.
68. Id.
69. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see infra note 97 and accompanying
text.
70. See, e.g., Fisher v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 352 So. 2d 729
(La. Ct. App. 1977) (allowing the use of Drug Enforcement Agency Reports which were
relevant and reliable), writ refused, 353 So. 2d 1338 (La. 1978)).
1991]
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dence, including records and documents in the possession of the agency
of which it desires to avail itself, shall be offered and made a part of
the record, and all such documentary evidence may be received in the
form of copies or excerpts .... ,,71 These practices raise significant
challenges to the reliability of evidence. Thus, fundamental fairness
demands that the courts avoid the unrestricted admission of evidence.
In Hall v. Louisiana State Racing Commission72 the Louisiana
Court of Appeals rejected unrestricted admission practices. The State
Racing Commission unsuccessfully sought to justify the admission into
evidence of the entire case file. In support of its position, the Commis-
sion advanced the traditional administrative law practice of liberally
admitting documents and records.7 The court rejected the admission
of the entire file and noted that implicit in all administrative hearings
is the necessity to reach a true disclosure of the facts to prevent arbi-
trary decisions.74 It is the ultimate duty of the administrative law judge
to make determinations of fact that are supported by sufficient and
competent evidence. Consequently, documents contained in an
agency's file, although arguably an exception to the hearsay rule, may
be inadmissible if the reliability of the evidence is questionable. The
Hall court noted:
We do not disagree with the principle that hearsay evidence, which
possesses probative value, may be submitted at an administrative
hearing, nor do we dispute the fact that the agent's records and re-
ports may be introduced into evidence. However, in the case before us
we are concerned with the problem of a trainer being suspended...
on a finding based only on hearsay documentary evidence. There was
no other competent evidence submitted . . .75
The court further recognized the importance of evidentiary theo-
ries to due process protection:
By this holding we do not intend to imply that hearsay evidence is
inadmissible, or that documentary evidence is incompetent in an ad-
ministrative hearing. Certainly they can be used, along with other
competent evidence to reach a true factual finding. However, where a
finding is based solely on this type of evidence and where an adverse
party is not able to inquire into the very basis of that evidence, both
substantive and procedural due process is violated. At the very least
Hall should have had the opportunity to crossexamine [sic] the only
71. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:956(2) (West 1987).
72. 505 So. 2d 744 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
73. Id. at 745-46.
74. Id. at 746.
75. Id.
[Vol. 42
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evidence used against him.7 1
Hall reveals that when technical rules of evidence are used appropri-
ately, they promote fundamental fairness."
Interestingly, even courts that uphold the flexibility of the admin-
istrative process recognize that credibility risks are inherent in the ad-
mission of hearsay evidence s.7 This concern resulted in the judicial for-
mulation of the residuum rule.79 This rule allows the admission of
hearsay evidence, but restricts its dispositive use. 0 The indiscriminate
admission of problematic evidence heightens the potential for confu-
sion and abuse, which is contrary to the goal of the administrative
process.
Adherence to the residuum rule would require the reversal of an
administrative finding that is based solely on hearsay evidence.,, The
per se restriction against dispositive use of hearsay evidence regardless
of the reliability of this evidence is a clear oversight. The residuum
rule does not suggest that traditionally reliable hearsay evidence could
be admissible for dispositive use. Rather, the residuum rule prohibits
the dispositive use of all hearsay evidence absent other supporting evi-
dence. Most trial judges would not adopt such a restrictive view.s2
Some courts are critical of modern evidentiary law principles when
they are confronted with the admissibility of hearsay. This was partic-
ularly evident in the development of the residuum rule. Consistent
76. Id. at 747.
77. This decision is consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., FED. R.
EVID. 805.
78. See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971).
79. The first announcement of the residuum rule is in Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice
Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 440-41, 113 N.E. 507, 508-09 (1916). The United States Supreme
Court implicitly adopted the rule in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
229-30 (1938), in which the court held that mere uncorroborated hearsay cannot support
an administrative order because an order must be based on substantial evidence.
80. Under the residuum rule, the trier of fact can rely on hearsay testimony only if
some nonhearsay evidence exists on the record. See, e.g., Carroll, 218 N.Y. at 440, 113
N.E. at 509 (while administrative inquiry is not limited by the rules of evidence, a resid-
uum of legal evidence must support the claim).
81. See, e.g., Carroll, 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916); see also Griffin v. Heath,
257 A.2d 488 (D.C. 1969) (affirming order of the Director of Motor Vehicles because
hearsay evidence supported the order).
The APA, when drafted, effectively incorporated the original residuum rule. Thus,
in application, reliable and probative evidence was uniquely nonhearsay. See S. Rep. No.
752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1945) (stating that while the exclusionary rules of evidence
do not apply to administrative procedures, no finding may be made except on some rele-
vant, reliable, and probative evidence).
82. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide explicitly defined exceptions under
which the circumstances of trustworthiness allow the admission of hearsay. See FED. R.
EVID. 803, 804.
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with traditional administrative law principles, the residuum rule was
never intended to be an evidentiary rule of exclusion. 3 This is true
notwithstanding the reason for the rule's development. 4 The residuum
rule unnecessarily encourages the admission of incompetent evidence
although it compromises exclusionary discretion in the administrative
process. The residuum rule is not a satisfactory solution to the extrane-
ous evidence problem. Although leading commentators criticize the le-
gal residuum rule, 0 the rule is followed in a majority of states.88
In Richardson v. Perales17 the United States Supreme Court mod-
ified the traditional application of the residuum rule. This modification
applies to federal administrative proceedings.8 In Richardson a party
challenged the admissibility and dispositive use of physician reports in
a social security disability claim hearing.8 The government advanced
these reports as dispositive proof to defeat the merits of the appellant's
disability claim.90 Although the proffered reports are hearsay, the
Court affirmed the administrative judge's admission and dispositive
use of such evidence.8' The Richardson Court rejected the purity of the
residuum rule and allowed the evidence to be admitted based on its
reliability and fairness.2 The Court stated: "Courts have recognized
the reliability and probative worth of written medical reports even in
formal trials and, while acknowledging their hearsay character, have
admitted them as an exception to the hearsay rule.
893
The Richardson analysis parallels modern theories of evidence. A
Colorado court recently stated: "[T]he use of hearsay. evidence . . .
does not violate due process guarantees so long as the hearsay evidence
'is sufficiently reliable and trustworthy, and as long as the evidence
possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonable and pru-
dent persons in the conduct of their affairs.' "'
83. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 117 (1976) (arguing that the
rule has been misinterpreted occasionally to prohibit the use of evidence in administra-
tive proceedings that would not be admissible under the federal rules).
84. The rule's development in Carroll merely precludes a decision from being
based solely on hearsay or other evidence not admissible under the Federal Rules. See
id.
85. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 7.4, at 350 (2d ed. 1984).
86. Id. § 7.4, at 356.
87. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
88. See Pierce, Use of the Federal Rules of Evidence in Federal Agency Adjudica-
tions, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1987).
89. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971).
90. Id. at 392-93.
91. Id. at 410.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 405.
94. Hancock v. State Dep't of Revenue, 758 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Colo. 1988) (quoting
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Proponents of the administrative law tradition often argue that
the application of the legal theories of hearsay disrupts the administra-
tive process.9 5 This viewpoint fails to recognize that hearsay law re-
straints are not mere technicalities, but are fundamental principles
which seek to preserve adversarial due process. "[Tihe hearsay rule is
not a technical rule of evidence but a basic, vital and fundamental rule
of law which ought to be followed by administrative agencies at those
points in their hearings when facts crucial to the issue are sought to be
placed on the record." 96 The administrative process, though flexible in
origin, must not be exempt from hearsay rules. Hearsay rules are nec-
essary to preserve fundamental adversarial fairness. Without them, the
credibility of evidence that is offered would be constantly challenged,
and unjust speculation would be permitted in an administrative dispo-
sition. Recent trends in the administrative law field recognize the im-
portance of adhering to the hearsay rule.
97
The actual application of the hearsay rule and its exceptions is
sometimes challenging. Recognition of the appropriate method of re-
view of evidence in administrative proceedings should be the primary
consideration. Application of technical evidentiary law in administra-
tive proceedings is the desirable remedy. The administrative process
can no longer use an informal system to review evidence and continue
to profess adherence to the adversarial process.
III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSIONARY
RULE THEORIES AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
The traditional view in administrative procedures opposes applica-
tion of the constitutional exclusionary rule.98 This is not surprising
given the administrative process's history of rejecting the rules of evi-
Colorado Dep't of Revenue v. Kirke, 743 P.2d 16, 21 (Colo. 1987)).
95. See, e.g., Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
689 (1964) (distinction between hearsay and nonhearsay is detrimental in the adminis-
trative process); Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal Administra-
tive Hearings, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1, 12-17 (excluding all hearsay prevents the use of some
probative evidence).
96. Blue Mountain Area School Dist. v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. Commw. 485, 488,
503 A.2d 1073, 1075 (1986) (quoting Bleilevens v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 11 Pa.
Commw. 1, 5, 312 A.2d 109, 111 (1973)).
97. See, e.g., Carlton v. California Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1428,
1433-34, 250 Cal. Rptr. 809, 811 (Ct. App. 1989); Eastman v. Department of Pub. Aid,
178 Ill. App. 3d 993, 996-97, 534 N.E.2d 458, 460-61 (1989); Midlands Util., Inc. v. South
Carolina Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, 298 S.C. 66, 68-69, 378 S.E.2d 256, 257-58
(1989).
98. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433 (1976); Holte v. State Highway Comm'r, 436 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1989).
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dence. 0 All too often, courts have refused to apply constitutional ex-
clusionary rules to civil-law proceedings' 00 because of the exaggerated
differences between criminal and civil-law proceedings. In fact, the
common thread of the adversarial system provides more similarities
than differences. 101
The application of exclusionary rule theories has long been consid-
ered a requirement in criminal proceedings. 10 The theories are in-
tended to serve as a deterrent to challenged police practices.' 0 ' In crim-
inal proceedings, protection against state manipulation of principles of
liberty is a primary concern.' 0 ' However, procedural safeguards should
not be limited to criminal cases. All judicial proceedings that may in-
fringe on individual rights, whether such proceedings concern property
entitlements or criminal proceedings, deserve procedural safeguards.
99. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
100. See cases cited supra note 98. The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guards against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials.
Unlike the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment does not textually preclude the
admission of evidence that is in breach of its provisions. Consequently, the judiciary
developed the exclusionary rule to preserve the substantive liberties that the Fourth
Amendment protects. The Fourth Amendment directly applies to the federal govern-
ment and is applied to the individual states through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
101. For a long time, the Supreme Court has had a jurisprudential interest in the
application of constitutional safeguards to both criminal and civil adversarial proceed-
ings. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
This interest has not manifested itself in uniform application of exclusionary rule
theories to civil proceedings. See Note, Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence in
Subsequent Civil Proceedings: Focusing on Motive to Determine Deterrence, 51 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1019 (1983) (explaining various criteria used by different courts to deter-
mine the applicability of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings).
In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), the Court noted
the procedural similarities between civil forfeiture proceedings and criminal actions. Id.
at 697-702. The Court reasoned that the illegally seized evidence was excludable under
Fourth Amendment principles. Id. at 702.
102. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 28 (1949); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 385 (1914).
103. See cases cited supra note 102.
104. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659.
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IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
The propriety of applying constitutional exclusionary theories to
the administrative process remains a problem.10 5 When the government
violates an individual's fundamental liberties in evidence production,
constitutional theories of exclusion should be applied equally to those
authorities who so act, be they civil or criminal. "It is anomalous to
enforce opposite rules in administrative and criminal proceedings con-
cerning evidence that is blighted by the same pollution; an unlawful
search violates the identical privacy."' 6 Fairness demands that the ex-
clusionary rule be applied in administrative proceedings when appro-
priate, because to do otherwise raises significant doubt about the legiti-
macy of the adversarial administrative function.1
07
In Turner v. City of Lawton0 8 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held
that suppressed evidence in a criminal action cannot be admitted in a
related administrative proceeding. 0 9 The City of Lawton dismissed the
petitioner from public employment when the police found narcotics in
his residence. 10 Subsequent to the petitioner's discharge, the criminal
charges were dismissed on Fourth Amendment grounds."' In the re-
lated post-termination administrative hearing, the challenged criminal
evidence was found admissible and dispositive."
2
On appeal the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the evidence
should have been excluded from the administrative action."1 By doing
this, the court intuitively recognized the need to apply exclusionary
theories to the administrative process." 4 The court rejected the city's
argument that wrongfully obtained evidence should remain admissible
in administrative hearings and held that such disputed evidence should
be excluded to deter municipal authorities from engaging in unlawful
searches and seizures.1 5 The court stated:
Here, we have a city law enforcement officer and a city civil proceed-
ing; thus the deterrence value of applying the exclusionary rule is ob-
105. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); Smith Steel Casting Co.
v. Brock, 800 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1986); Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014 (1983).
106. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.11 (2d ed. 1984).
107. See id.
108. 733 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 382.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 375.
114. See id. at 381-82.
115. Id. at 379.
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vious. If on the other hand, the evidence can be used to discharge
Turner from his job, even though the criminal charges were dismissed,
there would still be a substantial incentive to the city's police officers
to engage in further unlawful searches especially when municipal em-
ployees are the targets thereof.116
By recognizing the importance of applying exclusionary theories to
the administrative process, the Turner court significantly preserved
principles of fundamental fairness. State constitutional principles
greatly influenced the technical readings of Turner."' However, exclu-
sionary rule application in administrative proceedings has not found
general acceptance, 1 8 and holdings like Turner are in the distinct
minority. 1 9
Given modern courts' apparent willingness to strengthen fairness
determinations in contested administrative proceedings, the growth of
constitutional exclusionary safeguards within these proceedings should
become more evident although not without limitations.12 0
In Sheetz v. Mayor of Baltimore'21 the Maryland Court of Appeals
gave limited approval to the application of exclusionary rules to the
administrative process. This approach compromises traditional admin-
istrative thinking.122 The petitioner in Sheetz was discharged from his
public employment as a result of narcotics possession charges. 2 3 As in
Turner, the underlying criminal charges were dismissed on Fourth
Amendment grounds. 12 The court found the challenged evidence ad-
missible in the post-termination hearing, however, and the evidence
was dispositive of the termination issue.1 2 5 On appeal the Sheetz court
held that challenged evidence should be suppressed even in adminis-
trative actions if the government obtained its evidence by "bad faith"
actions. 28 The court held:
116. Id.
117. See id. at 380-82.
118. See Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Administrative Proceedings, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 564, 571-83 (1986).
119. The judicial development of the cost-benefit analysis of the admissibility of
evidence has significantly reduced the opportunity to use exclusionary rules during the
administrative process. This is detrimental to basic constitutional protections. See
Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1988, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 141-43 (1989).
120. See supra note 119.
121. 315 Md. 208, 553 A.2d 1281 (1989).
122. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
123. Sheetz v. Mayor of Baltimore, 315 Md. 208, 211, 553 A.2d 1281, 1282 (1989).
124. Id. at 210, 553 A.2d at 1282.
125. Id. at 211, 553 A.2d at 1282-83.
126. Id. at 210, 553 A.2d at 1282. The purpose of the exclusionary rule has been
debated since its development. Some have viewed this rule as a personal Fourth Amend-
ment constitutional right, while others have opined that the rule is merely a judicial
[Vol. 42
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss2/4
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
We note that the hearing officer below, in his thorough review of the
case, touched on many of these issues. However he seemed to con-
clude that illegally obtained evidence is always admissible in civil dis-
charge proceedings. Because such evidence, where properly chal-
lenged, is inadmissible upon a finding of bad faith, we must remand
for a new hearing in accordance with this opinion.
12 7
In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that in the absence of
such a holding, due process protections would necessarily be compro-
mised.128 The court reasoned that, although no actions may occur as
police attempt to find sufficient evidence to support criminal proceed-
ings against an individual, the police are not necessarily concerned
with employment regulations in termination proceedings and, thus, are
not tempted to violate Fourth Amendment rights to obtain evidence to
support such proceedings." 1 The court felt that under these circum-
stances, the exclusionary rule offers only minimal deterrent benefits
and should not necessarily be applied to administrative proceedings.130
These arguments are specious and unconvincing. A suggestion that
the police are somehow tempted to violate Fourth Amendment rights
because of the nature of the proceeding calls into question the veracity
of our institutional systems. This type of thinking is stirred by the
deterrent against suspect government conduct. See Yarborough, The Flexible Exclusion-
ary Rule and the Crime Rate, 6 Am. J. CRIm. L. 1 (1978); Note, Admissibility of Illegally
Seized Evidence in Subsequent Civil Proceedings; Focusing on Motive to Determine
Deterrence, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 1019 (1983). This academic discourse was ended by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). In Calandra the Su-
preme Court held that the deterrent function was the primary purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule. Id. at 347. This holding presupposes a balancing test for judicial evaluation of
deterrence benefits against the societal costs of excluding evidence. Since Calandra the
Supreme Court has employed balancing principles when it determines the admissibility
of illegally seized evidence. This is particularly evident in civil litigation disputes. See
United States v. Jones, 428 U.S. 433, 455-58 (1976); Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE
L.J. 906 (1986). Given the Court's acceptance of the deterrence theory, the development
of the good faith exception to application of the exclusionary rule arguably remains plau-
sible. However, this conclusion is not without critics. Proponents of the good faith excep-
tion argue that the application of the exclusionary rule to criminal law proceedings re-
sults in freedom for wrongdoers. These arguments are simplistic at a minimum, and
inconclusive as fact. See LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency": United States v.
Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 895, 904. However, recent
Supreme Court decisions have accepted such notions. See United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). Thus, the Court replaced the ra-
tionale of judicial integrity with pragmatic concerns for deterrence. See Note, supra note
118, at 367-68 (opponents of the exclusionary rule have long sought to weaken the judi-
cial integrity rationale by advancing deterrence as the primary concern of the rule).
127. Sheetz, 315 Md. at 217, 553 A.2d at 1085 (footnote omitted).
128. Id. at 213, 553 A.2d at 1283.
129. Id. at 215, 553 A.2d at 1284.
130. Id.
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meaningless attempt to justify application of the exclusionary rule on
the basis of deterrence. 31 The unfortunate result of this analysis is the
weighing of individual fundamental freedoms against hypothetical the-
ories of social economics. Freedoms should not be assigned monetary
values.
132
The deterrent effect alone should not necessarily be dispositive of
the application of the exclusionary rule within the administrative pro-
cess. Instead, the exclusionary rule should find acceptability as a reme-
dial safeguard against Fourth Amendment abuses. The Sheetz court's
holding apparently agrees with this conclusion. The court stated:
As a matter of administrative law, we are unwilling to hold that such
evidence is always admissible. Although discharge proceedings are not
usually designed to be punitive and therefore do not fall within the
scope of primary police interest, they may be manipulated to serve
punishment purposes. In this context, the police deterrent gained
from barring the admission of illegally obtained evidence is needed.
We therefore hold that such evidence is inadmissible in civil adminis-
trative discharge proceedings where the defendant establishes that the
police were improperly motivated to illegally seize evidence to benefit
civil proceedings.
1 33
Minnesota recently faced similar constitutional challenges. In
Minnesota State Patrol Troopers Association v. State Department of
Public Safety1 3 4 the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the applica-
tion of exclusionary rules to state arbitration proceedings.1 35 The peti-
tioner in this case was a public employee who was discharged from his
work for conduct unbecoming a public servant. 36 In post-termination
arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator found admissible evidence that
had been challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds. This evidence
was dispositive on the issue of the petitioner's dismissal.' 3' Specifically,
objections were filed alleging that petitioner's residence had been sub-
ject to an improper search and seizure by the government. 3 8 Consis-
tent with traditional administrative thought, an arbitrator found the
challenges to be meritlessY13 The petitioner agreed that the challenged
131. See supra note 126.
132. See Note, supra note 118, at 570-71.
133. Sheetz v. Mayor of Baltimore, 315 Md. 208, 215-16, 553 A.2d 1281, 1284-85
(1989).
134. 437 N.W.2d 670 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
135. Id. at 676.
136. Id. at 672-73.
137. Id. at 674.
138. Id. at 674-75.
139. Id. at 674.
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search was conducted pursuant to an outstanding search warrant. 140
His challenge was based on a claim of insufficient probable cause to
support the issuance of the search warrant.' 4 ' The state district court
affirmed the decision of the arbitrator and held that the arbitrator
properly admitted the evidence because it was obtained under an ex-
isting search warrant.'42
The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the
requirement of probable cause is irrelevant in a civil action about a
labor dispute and reversed the district court."43 The court held that
evidence seized pursuant to a defective search warrant must be sup-
pressed."4 The court specifically indicated that its suppression rule
was not conditional and could be applied in proceedings other than
criminal proceedings."
4 5
Because we find that the search warrant lacked probable cause and we
declined to adopt a good-faith exception, we hold that evidence seized
in the search should have been suppressed at the arbitration hearing.
The primary purpose, if not the sole purpose, of the exclusionary rule
is to deter future unlawful police conduct. To give effect to this deter-
rent function, we cannot allow one government agency to use the
fruits of unlawful conduct by another branch of the same agency to
obtain an employee's dismissal.
14
1
The Minnesota Court of Appeals obviously recognized the impor-
tance of preserving fundamental principles of due process in adminis-
trative proceedings. Due process principles should apply to criminal
proceedings, and they should not neglect the protective safeguards that
Fourth Amendment principles are designed to preserve. "It would
seem wholly at odds with our tradition to allow the admission of evi-
dence illegally.seized by Government agents in discharge proceedings,
which the Court has analogized to proceedings that involve the imposi-
11147tion of criminal sanctions ....
Administrative tribunals should be applying constitutional exclu-
sionary theories technically to the administrative process. Leading
commentators acknowledge the importance of the development of the
exclusionary rule in safeguarding Fourth Amendment principles,"48
140. Id. at 675-76.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 676.
145. See id. (Minnesota declined to adopt the good faith exception to the exclusion-
ary rule which was announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). Id.
146. Id. (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 676 (quoting Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
148. See Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Princi-
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notwithstanding the ever-present criticism.149 The focus of this criti-
cism lies in the rule's limited application within criminal proceed-
ings.1 50 Limited application should be expected, however, because of
the developmental origins of the exclusionary rule. A limitation on ap-
plication, therefore, does not reflect a total conceptual rejection.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has accepted, with limitation,
some of the critics' arguments5 by developing and applying excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule within the criminal process. 152 For the
moment, constitutional exclusionary rule theories generally remain the
law, although these theories have been modified."5 " This modification
should find limited acceptance, if any, in criminal proceedings. 5 4 Thus,
the current criticism against exclusionary rule usage should not pre-
vent application of the rule in alternative dispute forums. Indeed,
traditional administrative thinking rejects application of the exclusion-
ary rule and, thus, weakens the importance of the debate about its
exceptions. 55
Although the Supreme Court generally continues to sanction ex-
pies Basis" Rather Than on "an Empirical Proposition?," 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565
(1983); LaFave, supra note 126; Morris, The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence and Pos-
ner's Economic Analysis of Law, 57 WASH. L. REV. 647 (1982).
149. See supra note 126.
150. The United States Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime recom-
mended that courts should not exclude evidence from consideration at trial if the officer
acted reasonably in good faith. See ATTORNEY GEN.'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FINAL REPORT 55 (1981).
At the judicial level, retired Chief Justice Warren Burger long advanced the aboli-
tion of the exclusionary rule. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
411-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
151. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (refusing to exclude evidence
obtained by the use of a search warrant ultimately found to be invalid); Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431 (1984) (refusing to exclude evidence pertaining to the discovery and condi-
tion of the victim's body on grounds that the body ultimately would have been discov-
ered is not a constitutional breach).
152. See cases cited supra note 151.
153. Id.
154. Exceptions to the exclusionary rule are an unjust judicial compromise of
Fourth Amendment safeguards. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 126, at 947-48. Illegally
seized evidence should not be admissible in either criminal or civil proceedings. If it is
admissible, it unjustifiably rejects judicial integrity. As Justice Brandeis observed:
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds con-
tempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end
justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
155. See supra note 105.
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clusionary rule policies, administrative application of these policies has
not received general acceptance by the Court. 15 For example, in INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza' 57 the Court held that constitutional exclusionary
rules are not applicable to administrative deportation proceedings. 158
In INS the police arrested Lopez-Mendoz and Sandoval-Sanchez, both
foreign nationals, summoned them to individual immigration hearings,
and thereafter, deported them from the United States. 59 Each respon-
dent was arrested at his employer's premises without the benefit of a
search or arrest warrant.' At their respective deportation hearings,
the INS presented evidence obtained during the allegedly unlawful ar-
rests.'6  Based on the evidence presented, the immigration judges de-
cided to deport the respondents. 16 2 In an administrative appeal to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the respondents' counsel raised
Fourth Amendment challenges and sought to apply the exclusionary
rule. 6 3 Consistent with traditional administrative thinking, the BIA
denied the Fourth Amendment challenges.
64
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the prece-
dent that constitutional exclusionary rules generally only apply to
criminal law proceedings.6 5 In its decision, the Court acknowledged
that certain decisional frameworks exist for determining the applicabil-
ity of exclusionary rules in noncriminal proceedings.16  Specifically, the
Court identified a cost-benefit analysis which may be used to deter-
mine the admissibility of unlawfully seized evidence in a civil deporta-
tion hearing. 1 67 The Court's analysis unnecessarily invites the problem-
156. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
157. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
158. Id. at 1050-51.
159. Id. at 1034.
160. Id. at 1035-37.
161. Id. at 1036-38.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1038.
165. See id. at 1041.
166. Id. (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) as the Court's decision
that established a framework for determining the applicability of the exclusionary rule).
167. See id. The increased attention to the cost-benefit analysis may be attributed
to the .unique role of deterrence as the justification for application of the exclusionary
rule. Such an analytical disposition, however, remains controversial. Some commentators
critically note the disproportionate ease in which courts find overwhelming societal costs
when weighed against a defendant's expectant constitutional benefits. See Schwartz,
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Administrative Law: Does It Make Priceless Procedural Rights
Worthless?, 37 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 14 (1985). Thus, balancing continues to raise concerns
about the integrity of judicial interests in upholding constitutional safeguards. Dripps,
supra note 126, at 948.
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atic justification for reducing exclusionary rule protections.168
Although deterrence is an important function, it should not neces-
sarily be the exclusive rationale for evidence suppression. The Court
alluded to the weakness of the deterrence function when it noted that
"INS's attention to Fourth Amendment interests cannot guarantee
that constitutional violations will not occur, but it does reduce the
likely deterrent value of the exclusionary rule. Deterrence must be
measured at the margin."' 69
It is interesting to note that while the Lopez-Mendoza Court con-
demned the Fourth Amendment violations that may have occurred
during the respondents' arrest, it accepted the cost-benefit approach
and found the exclusionary rule inapplicable to deportation proceed-
ings. 17 0 Application of Fourth Amendment constitutional protections
should not depend, however, on the type of litigation. The Fourth
Amendment was designed to protect and ensure principles of funda-
mental fairness.
The Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza expressly left open the
question whether exclusion of evidence might be appropriate if the evi-
dence was obtained by egregious violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment.'7 ' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Arguelles- Vasquez v.
INS172 partially answered the question of what constitutes egregious
violations. In that case, the police detained, arrested, questioned, sum-
moned to an immigration hearing, and later deported the respondent, a
168. Using cost-benefit analysis standards, the Lopez Court rejected the use of the
exclusionary rule in administrative proceedings. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032, 1041-50 (1984). The Court concluded that the exclusionary rule added little addi-
tional protection to Fourth Amendment rights in civil deportation proceedings and that
the costs of applying the rule outweighed the benefits. Id. at 1050. In an attempt to
justify its static conclusions, the Court suggested that exclusion of evidence challenged
under the Fourth Amendment would require courts to ignore continuing violations of the
law and would unreasonably complicate the administrative process. Id. at 1046-49.
The Court's rationale is without constitutional credibility. The continued reliance on
the deterrence function for application of the exclusionary rule contributes to this sus-
pect analysis. The deterrence standard necessarily requires a balance between the con-
duct of a government agent and the respondent's constitutional rights. Justices Brennan
and Marshall, in dissent, each argued that the exclusionary rule is derived substantively
from the textual requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1051, 1060. Thus, a
litigant's constitutional rights should not be the subject of a pragmatic balance. Id. at
1050-51, 1060-61. Both Justices Brennan and Marshall would have precluded the admis-
sion of the challenged evidence. Id.
169. Id. at 1045.
170. See id. at 1050.
171. Id.
172. 786 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated, 844 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988) (opinion
vacated because petitioner's status changed pursuant to Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act).
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foreign national, from the United States.17 3 No magistrate issued a
warrant prior to the respondent's apprehension and detention. 17 4 While
in detention, the respondent made incriminating statements about his
citizenship.
17 5
At the deportation hearing, the respondent claimed that he had
been seized solely because of his Hispanic ethnicity. The respondent
then moved to suppress all evidence obtained in derogation of his
Fourth Amendment rights.176 The respondent requested that the immi-
gration judge call for cross-examination of the arresting officer to ex-
plore the legality of the respondent's arrest.7 7 The judge denied the
respondent's request and refused to apply the exclusionary rule to the
administrative process.1
78
On appeal the court held that the refusal of the lower court to
apply the exclusionary rule constituted egregious constitutional
error.
17 9
An officer who detains an individual based solely on Hispanic appear-
ance in order to inquire about the legality of the individual's presence
in this country flouts the well-established pronouncement ... that
Hispanic appearance alone is insufficient to justify a stop .... such
official conduct constitutes an egregious violation of the fourth
amendment requiring suppression of any evidence obtained through
the stop.18 0
An egregious misconduct standard for the application of exclusion-
ary rule theories in the administrative process is too narrow. This stan-
dard invites judicial complicity when constitutionally defective evi-
dence is presented to the court.
Sufficient reason for excluding from civil deportation proceedings evi-
dence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is that there is
no other way to achieve "the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to
avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring
the people-all potential victims of unlawful government con-
duct-that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior,
thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government."'181
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (Respondent stated he was a citizen of Mexico and had entered the United
States without an immigration inspection).
176. Id. at 1434.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1436.
180. Id. at 1435.
181. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1060-61 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
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Interestingly, the Arguelles- Vasquez court avoided all references
to the cost-benefit deterrence analysis. Instead, the court focused on
Fourth Amendment limitations on governmental privacy encroach-
ments.18 2 These holdings are consistent with principles of fundamental
fairness.
Thus, when appropriate, the exclusionary rule should be applied
within the administrative setting.
Certainly nothing in the language or history of the Fourth Amend-
ment suggests that a recognition of this evidentiary link between the
police and the courts was meant to be foreclosed. It is difficult to give
any meaning at all to the limitations imposed by the Amendment if
they are read to proscribe only certain conduct by the police but to
allow other agents of the same government to take advantage of evi-
dence secured by the police in violation of its requirements. The
Amendment therefore must be read to condemn not only the initial
unconstitutional invasion of privacy-which is done, after all, for the
purpose of securing evidence-but also the subsequent use of any evi-
dence so obtained.. . . Such a conception of the rights secured by the
Fourth Amendment was unquestionably the original basis of what has
come to be called the exclusionary rule .... 13
Application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should
not be predicated on theories of deterrence alone. Application predi-
cated solely on deterrence theories permits courts to speculate unrea-
sonably about the admission of constitutionally challenged evidence.
Improper speculation results from courts' continued insistence on us-
ing cost-benefit analyses to determine the admissibility of challenged
evidence.
Use of cost-benefit analyses to determine the admissibility of evi-
dence necessarily invites courts to engage in different calculation meth-
ods. In so doing, the possibility exists for arbitrary standards of admis-
sion evaluation. For understandable reasons, courts should abandon
the use of cost-benefit analyses as the principle method for determin-
ing the applicability of the exclusionary rule. A return to textual con-
stitutional analysis when Fourth Amendment claims are present would
reinstate adversarial integrity to the judicial system and retire prag-
matic solutions of constitutional compromise. Ts
(quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
182. See Arguelles-Vasquez v. INS, 786 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated, 844
F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988).
183. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 933-35 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184. See Nigro, The Exclusionary Rule in Administrative Proceedings, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 564, 587-89 (1986).
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V. FIFTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
The courts similarly have been reluctant to acknowledge Fifth
Amendment defenses in administrative proceedings."8 5 This is not sur-
prising given the general understandings of Fifth Amendment develop-
ment.' The growth of Fifth Amendment challenges to evidence was
precipitated by the interrogation practices within the criminal law pro-
cess.'87 The first rules governing the admissibility of these challenged
responses were developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries.""8 The goal then, as it is now, was to deny the admission of re-
sponses which had been coerced by the government.
Although Fifth Amendment challenges grew out of response to a
criminal law problem, this should not prevent the protection's applica-
tion in administrative proceedings."' Because the text of the Fifth
Amendment refers to its application in "any criminal case," however,
application of the Fifth Amendment to the administrative process re-
mains judicially more circumspect than application of Fourth Amend-
ment protections.'"0 The government's use of interrogation in criminal
185. Though Fifth Amendment privileges have found select administrative accept-
ance, courts are reluctant to invite general use of such constitutional defenses in admin-
istrative proceedings. This reluctance may be due to the textual limitations of the
amendment. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (deportation proceedings);
Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949) (administrative investigation proceedings);
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (constitutional regulatory proceedings).
186. The Fifth Amendment privilege first developed as a primary defense against
the sometimes unfair government practice of compulsory witness interrogation within
the criminal law process. See Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy
for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932), reprinted in 73 MICH. L. REv. 39
(1974).
187. Id.
188. See C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 120 (1954); 8 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (3d ed. 1961).
189. This is strengthened by the recognition that certain administrative actions may
encourage investigatory and privilege limiting practices. A litigant's self-incrimination
defense should and must become paramount for administrative protection. See Lefko-
witz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
190. The Fifth Amendment provides in part "nor shall [any person] be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment has made this portion of the Fifth Amendment applicable to
the states. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
This Article argues that the primary reason to apply the Fourth Amendment's ex-
clusionary rule should be to achieve the due process standard of judicial integrity, rather
than to accomplish the functional goal of deterrence. This is true even though the courts
have decided otherwise. Thus, application of the Fourth Amendment appears more likely
than the use of Fifth Amendment principles in administrative proceedings. The textual
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proceedings enhances such thinking. However, in theory, Fifth Amend-
ment protections are not exclusively within the domain of criminal
law.
191
Application of Fifth Amendment challenges in administrative pro-
ceedings remains conditional. To successfully invoke a Fifth Amend-
ment privilege in an administrative proceeding, a witness must show
that he probably will be involved in a subsequent criminal prosecution
in which the challenged evidence may be dispositive.' 9 ' This is the rule
despite the possibility that the government may use the testimony in a
later proceeding other than a criminal prosecution.
The ability of administrative bodies to affect individual action
may invite questionable civil interrogation. To prevent such potential
abuse, Fifth Amendment protections should be applied unconditionally
in all administrative proceedings. 193 Failure to do so encourages the
compromise of basic human liberties.
9 4
Penalizing a person for asserting the self-incrimination privilege in ef-
fect defeats the privilege. Therefore, the constitutional provision cre-
ating the privilege must protect an individual not only from punish-
ment for refusing to answer an incriminating question but also from
punishment for invoking the privilege .... A condition which re-
quires a surrender of a constitutional right, however, may be an un-
constitutional condition. It has been held in a variety of situations
that a state cannot abrogate a constitutional right by making the for-
bearance of that right a condition of carrying on a lawful activity and
that a person is not bound to relinquish the privilege of carrying on
the activity upon failure to comply with such a condition."9 5
Given these procedural reservations, officials in administrative pro-
ceedings should recognize Fifth Amendment privileges without prior
condition, and this preserves the Fifth Amendment safeguards.
The effect of Fifth Amendment claims on the introduction of evi-
language of the Fifth Amendment may continually restrict its use. However, the lan-
guage should be irrelevant. The focus of the Fifth Amendment is on the evidence rather
than on the reasonableness of the securing officer's conduct. As a result, Fifth Amend-
ment protections should be applied more frequently than Fourth Amendment
safeguards.
191. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
192. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 50 (1968); Estate of Fisher v. Commis-
sioner, 905 F.2d 645, 649 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Jones, 703 F.2d 473, 476 (10th
Cir. 1983).
193. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 334 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
194. See United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 177-78 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
195. Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
24 U. CH. L. RE V. 472, 495 (1957) (footnotes omitted).
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dence differs significantly between civil and criminal proceedings. The
primary difference is that an adverse inference may be drawn from a
witness's silence in a civil proceeding.119 Allowing a negative inference
to be drawn from a witness's silence in a civil proceeding arguably
compromises Fifth Amendment privileges. This is particularly true
when a party advances Fifth Amendment claims in proceedings that
appear to have overlapping civil and criminal law functions.197 Because
of their regulatory demands, administrative law proceedings are pro-
ceedings of this type.
In a civil suit involving only private parties, no party brings to the
battle the awesome powers of the government, and therefore to permit
an adverse inference to be drawn from exercise of the privilege does
not implicate the policy considerations underlying the privilege. But
where the government "deliberately seeks" the answers to incrimina-
tory questions, allowing it to benefit from the exercise of the privilege
aids, indeed encourages, governmental circumvention of our adversary
system.198
The administrative process should not allow adverse inferences to
be drawn from a witness's silence, which clearly compromises the wit-
ness's civil liberties. The administrative process, despite this conclu-
sion, remains traditional and selective in its application of Fifth
Amendment protections. For this, recent administrative decisions de-
serve criticism.
In Roach v. National Transportation Safety Board'9 9 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the administrative denial of Fifth
Amendment witness challenges. 200 The appellant in Roach argued that
his compelled testimony in an administrative proceeding compromised
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 20' The court,
noting that the Fifth Amendment has two distinct protections, rejected
this claim. The court held that (1) a defendant in a criminal trial has
an absolute right not to be compelled to testify; and (2) any witness,
including a defendant, in any governmental proceeding, formal or in-
formal, has the constitutional right not to answer questions that may
incriminate him.
202
196. Id. at 475-76.
197. See id. at 493-511 (discussing discharge of public employees for asserting Fifth
Amendment privilege).
198. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 335 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
199. 804 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).
200. Id. at 1151.
201. Id.
202. Id. Unlike the arguments advanced against conditional Fifth Amendment civil
application, fear of imminent criminal prosecution is the traditional standard of civil
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The Roach court's decision hinged on whether the proceedings
were to be considered civil or criminal in nature; the nature of the pro-
ceeding was the dispositive issue.203 The appellant contended that the
administrative proceedings were quasi-criminal and, therefore, abso-
lute immunity prevailed.204 The court found Congressional intent to be
contrary to this policy and rejected the claim that the proceeding was
criminal in nature.205 Based on this holding, the court upheld the lower
court's refusal to apply the Fifth Amendment to the administrative
proceeding. By doing this, the court rejected appellant's general claim
of Fifth Amendment violations.206 The Roach court held that for an
administrative claimant to protect his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, he must make specific and timely objections to each question that
the government poses.2°7 The record in Roach is devoid of such objec-
tions.208 Perhaps the issue in Roach is best explained by suggesting
that counsel inappropriately objected to the proffered evidence, and
the court justifiably responded by reference to the most technical of
evidentiary theories. 208 Potential compromises of due process protec-
tions should not be overridden by technical evidentiary rules.
The Roach court utilized a traditional approach by differentiating
between criminal and civil proceedings. The court's adherence to tradi-
tional administrative law theories resulted in a compromised verdict in
which the court denied the defendant a valid privilege by government
regulators. As a result of the court's action, it found fault within the
appellant's own testimony. This comment is made without passing
judgment on the merit of the Roach court's statutory findings. 2 10 The
court should have used a less limiting definition of Fifth Amendment
incrimination claims. Such claims must show legitimate apprehension of danger from
direct governmental inquiry. See United States v. Jones, 703 F.2d 473 (10th Cir. 1983).
In the absence of immunity, a civil litigant may experience adverse inferences from their
chosen privilege of silence.
203. Roach v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 804 F.2d 1147, 1152-53 (10th Cir. 1986),
cert, denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).
204. Id. at 1150-52.
205. Id. at 1153.
206. Id. at 1154.
207. Id. at 1152 n.5.
208. Id.
209. See FED. R. EvID. 103(a). The rule provides in part:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected and, in case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record,
stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent
from the context.
Id.
210. See Roach v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 804 F.2d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).
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privilege.
In Thomas v. Bible211 the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Nevada rejected the plaintiff's claim that his Fifth Amendment
rights were violated when he refused to testify before the State Gaming
Commission and, as a result, the plaintiff was denied the return of his
state gaming license.2 12 The plaintiff was appealing the Commission's
revocation of his state gaming license due to his alleged association
with organized crime. 213 The plaintiff, asserting Fifth Amendment de-
fenses, refused to participate in the administrative investigation of the
matter.214 He refused to cooperate with the administrative investiga-
tion because he feared having to incriminate others while simultane-
ously encouraging the discovery of additional evidence that could be
used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings. 1 5 Such strategic
thinking has not received judicial approval for preserving Fifth
Amendment challenges within the administrative process. Instead,
courts have recognized that self-incrimination claims within the ad-
ministrative process are only preserved by timely objections to specific
inquiries by the government.
216
In rejecting the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment challenges, the Bible
court returned to the familiar theme that the administrative hearing is
not criminal in scope, but is a civil and administrative inquiry.21 7 As a
result, the court dismissed all claims of absolute immunity.218 Further-
more, responding to the plaintiff's self-incrimination arguments, the
court noted that speculative fears of criminal prosecution are insuffi-
cient to invoke Fifth Amendment protections.
21 9
To properly invoke the privilege against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion, a defendant must be faced with "substantial hazards of self-in-
crimination," that are "real and appreciable" and not merely "imagi-
nary and unsubstantial." Moreover, the defendant must have
"reasonable cause to apprehend [such] danger from a direct answer"
to questions posed to him.220
The court likewise rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the po-
tential incrimination of others justifies extending Fifth Amendment
211. 694 F. Supp. 750 (D. Nev. 1988), aff'd, 896 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
212. Id. at 755, 768.
213. Id. at 754.
214. Id. at 765.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 764.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 766.
219. See id. at 764.
220. Id. (citations omitted).
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protections. 2 1 The court held that this type of injury was too remote
to invoke Fifth Amendment protections.22
Perhaps this case turns on the issue of specificity of proof rather
than being a theoretical rejection of applying the Fifth Amendment to
the administrative process. If so, then the court's actions are persua-
sive. A critical review of the Bible court's rationale suggests, however,
an indifference to Fifth Amendment protections. The court supports
this interpretation in its holding that application of the Fifth Amend-
ment in administrative proceedings is accepted against refusals to a
direct inquiry, but rejected when applied to claims of coerced coopera-
tion in investigatory proceedings by the government.
22 3
Such efforts at distinction are incomplete and are not persuasive.
Constitutional compromises of Fifth Amendment protections can occur
under either of the controlled situations.
Compulsive violati[on of] the privilege is present in any proceeding,
criminal or civil, where a government official puts questions to an in-
dividual with the knowledge that the answers might tend to incrimi-
nate him. Such a distinction is mandated by one of the fundamental
purposes of the Fifth Amendment: to preserve our adversary system
of criminal justice by preventing the government from circumventing
that system by abusing its powers.
22'
Administrative tribunals must readily embrace Fifth Amendment
protections without forum restrictions. Governmental threats to com-
pel interrogation of a witness should be the focus of the standard. A
finding of these intrusions should result in the exclusion of the evi-
dence as a matter of procedural integrity. Guarantees of administrative
fairness demand no less. "As a general rule the exclusionary rule does
not attach to civil or administrative proceedings. However, . . .the
right to invoke the exclusionary rule at an administrative proceeding
would carry a reassuring aura of fairness ... 225
Admittedly, neither historic nor administrative advocacy permits
absolute application of the Fifth Amendment privilege.2 26
In Ciccone v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human
Services227 the court upheld the denial of Fifth Amendment witness
221. Id. at 765.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 344 (1976) (emphasis added) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
225. In re Establishment Inspection of Hern Iron Works, Inc., 881 F.2d 722, 729
(9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
226. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
227. 861 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1988).
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challenges in an administrative proceeding.2 2 In Ciccone the peti-
tioner, who was self-employed, filed for old-age insurance benefits
under the Social Security Act. The petitioner alleged that he had re-
tired as of a certain date, but the petitioner refused to supply proof of
his actual retirement date. Based on the petitioner's refusal, the secre-
tary denied the requested benefits pending further proof of the peti-
tioner's retirement. The petitioner refused to comply with the govern-
ment's requests for additional information regarding his occupation
and asserted claims that compliance would violate his Fifth Amend-
ment right. Without this necessary information, the secretary felt com-
pelled to deny petitioner's request for retirement benefits. 229
The court rejected, as frivolous, the petitioner's Fifth Amendment
challenges.230
Thus, simply because the government provides benefits to those who
qualify and who comply with its regulations, does not mean that it
must give benefits to all those who apply regardless of their compli-
ance with those regulations. Nor does it mean that one who has relied
on the promise of benefits to come is compelled to file for them upon
retirement. Mr. Ciccone fails to meet the first test for claiming the
protection of the privilege of the Fifth Amendment: his application
was not compelled. 31
The administrative denial of petitioner's Fifth Amendment argu-
ment in the Ciccone case was proper and reasonable as a matter of law.
In the absence of the requisite compulsory interrogation threats, Fifth
Amendment defenses are without cause.
Given the courts' concerns about application of the exclusionary
rule, indiscriminate use of the Fifth Amendment's defenses may en-
courage restrictive constitutional application. This should be avoided
by administrative litigants. Notably, the court in Ciccone did not reject
application of Fifth Amendment privileges based on criminal or civil
dichotomies nor on forum descriptions. The court demonstrated judi-
cial foresight and rejected the application of both these traditional
theories.
In Esposito v. Adams" 2 the United States District Court for the
District of Illinois affirmed the rejection of Fifth Amendment constitu-
tional challenges in an administrative proceeding. 33 The plaintiff in
Esposito argued that investigatory questioning conducted prior to his
228. Id. at 18.
229. Id. at 15.
230. Id. at 18.
231. Id. at 17.
232. 700 F. Supp. 1470 (N.D. IlM. 1988).
233. Id. at 1478.
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extradition hearing breached his Fifth Amendment protections. 3 4 In
particular, the plaintiff claimed that the inquiry was made even though
he expressly desired to see an attorney.2 35 The plaintiff argued that the
alleged breaches were self-incriminating.
36
In rejecting the plaintiff's constitutional challenges, the Esposito
court held that the Fifth Amendment's guarantees against self-incrimi-
nation are not applicable to extradition proceedings. 27 The court's de-
cision was based on its finding that extradition proceedings are neither
criminal nor adversarial. 38 The absence of rational selectivity makes
the court's decision a questionable one. Furthermore, the court's insis-
tence on reviewing Fifth Amendment challenges on a forum definition
standard is troubling. Though the court took a very traditional ap-
proach in its decision, it should not have given judicial approval to this
type of abuse, regardless of the nature of the proceeding.
Further review of the Esposito decision demonstrates a rejection
of the Sixth Amendment.2 39 The rhetorical discussion of Sixth Amend-
ment challenges presumably emanated from the plaintiff's claims that
he had been interrogated in the absence of any counsel in violation of
his right to counsel.2 40 In dicta the Esposito court implied that Sixth
Amendment protections apply only in criminal proceedings.2 41 This de-
termination is constitutionally doubtful.
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our juris-
prudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously
injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on
fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must
be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show
that it is untrue.. . . We have formalized these protections in require-
ments of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient
roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment .... This court
has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken
out not only in criminal cases, but also in all types of cases where
administrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny.242
234. Id. at 1477.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1478.
237. Id. at 1477. The Esposito court in part sought to defend its rationale on the
factual basis that the challenged inquiry was not significantly intruding. It did not argue
that it excluded the Fifth Amendment privileges because of the nature of the proceed-
ings. See id. at 1478. Judicial preservation of constitutional rights, however, should not
depend on the degree of the claimed intrusion.
238. Id.
239. See id.
240. Id. at 1477.
241. Id. at 1478.
242. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959). Congress enacted the Ad-
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Though application of Fifth Amendment privileges to the adminis-
trative process remains traditional and selective, litigants deserve
more. These constitutional protections should be complied with uni-
formly regardless of the government forum. Inherent in our adversarial
process is the protection of individual liberties. The administrative
process must promote these values.
VI. CONCLUSION
The application of technical evidence and constitutional law prin-
ciples assures fairness of process to the administrative litigant.
Perhaps the most salient implication of this development is its recog-
nition of the interaction and interdependence of the mechanisms and
processes for dispute resolution. The time for insularity and isolation
of our judicial and administrative instrumentalities is over. If access
to justice is to become realistically available to all Americans, we must
learn to select and apply systematically the strengths of each of our
mechanisms of redress and resolution.1
43
The administrative application of technical evidence and constitutional
law theories increases the formalization of the administrative process.
However, this should not invite rejection of the theories. Traditional-
ists continue to object to such formalization and believe that the pro-
cess compromises the founding administrative principles of dispatch
and flexibility. A universal reminder must be advanced to these observ-
ers that the adversarial process, by definition, should provide exclu-
sionary safeguards against problematic evidentiary offerings. Such for-
malization is fundamental to the adversarial process and must be
preserved.
Blinded by past pronouncements, traditional administrative theo-
rists argue that the administrative application of evidence and consti-
tutional law theories inappropriately masks the administrative process
in favor of historic advocacy. These observations seek to raise signifi-
cant doubt about the propriety for such judicial limits.
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
ministrative Procedure Act to safeguard right to counsel protections. The administrative
process has accepted this right as a fundamental right for some time. Administrative
Procedure Act, ch. 24, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,
701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344 (1988)).
243. Rosenblum, Chairman's Message, a New Twist to Exhaustion of Remedies?, 30
ADMIN. L. REV. v, vii (1978).
1991]
33
Glicksman: Judicialization of the Administrative Process: Adversarial Risks
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.2 44
The passage of years since the inception of the administrative pro-
cess has gradually seen institutional changes that warrant more adver-
sarial structure. Recent judicial trends selectively invite such jurispru-
dential progressions. Because of the inherent limitations of legal
commentators to influence institutional reform, the impetus for such
change continues to lie with the courts and legislatures of this
nation.
245
244. O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920).
245. The United States Department of Labor recently reviewed its interest in the
application of the Federal Rules of Evidence to administrative proceedings. Although the
Department recommended many rule revisions, the technical application of the codified
hearsay rule remains operative. See 29 C.F.R. § 18 (1990).
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